The Recent crises have seen very large spikes in asset price risk without dramatic shifts in fundamentals. We propose an explanation for these risk panics based on self-fulfilling shifts in risk made possible by a negative link between the current asset price and risk about the future asset price. This link implies that risk about tomorrow's asset price depends on uncertainty about risk tomorrow. This dynamic mapping of risk into itself gives rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling shifts in risk. We show that this can generate risk panics. The impact of the panic is larger when the shift from a low to a high risk equilibrium takes place in an environment of weak fundamentals. The sharp increase in risk leads to a large drop in the asset price, decreased leverage and reduced market liquidity. We show that the model can account well for the developments during the recent financial crisis. © The Authors. All rights reserved. No part of this paper may be reproduced without the permission of the authors. 
Introduction
Sharp surges in risk are a prominent feature of nancial panics, such as the turmoil in the Fall of 2008 or the 2010 Eurozone debt crisis. Volatility, as measured by the VIX index, more than quadrupled in the wake of the Lehman Brothers failure, and tripled during the debt crisis. While crises entail adverse fundamental news, these are hard-pressed to account for such large surges in risk. The precarious scal situation of Greece was long known. Similarly, while the 2008 panic was linked to large scale mortgage market losses, these were not suddenly discovered in the Fall of 2008 and had instead gradually built for at least a year prior to the panic. We o er a theory for such events, which we refer to as \risk panics", that focuses on sudden large self-ful lling shifts in risk, as well as the volatility of risk. Our main contribution is to develop a theoretical foundation for such risk panics. Self-ful lling shifts in risk can occur when the current equilibrium asset price depends on risk associated with the future asset price. 2 Intuitively, higher risk reduces asset demand, which reduces the price. There is then a dynamic degree of freedom in the model. Risk is de ned in terms of uncertainty about the asset price tomorrow. But the asset price tomorrow in turn depends on risk perceptions tomorrow. Therefore risk today depends on uncertainty about risk tomorrow. As risk does not just depend on uncertainty about future asset payo s but also on future risk itself, self-ful lling shifts in both risk and the volatility of risk are possible.
The possibility of self-ful lling shifts in risk arises only when the current asset price depends on risk about the future asset price. This link is absent in the standard frictionless expected utility framework used in macroeconomics, where 1 We do not wish to rule out the importance of fundamental shocks during the recent crises, but we are not aware of any model that would generate such a huge spike in risk in response to observed fundamental shocks. An alternative approach to ours is that of Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) , who consider a model with Knightian uncertainty (i.e. inmeasurable risks). In that setup \new shocks" (e.g. the decision to let Lehman Brothers fail) can generate increased uncertainty as there is no history of events to measure probabilities. Another approach is found in Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) , where the economy can suddenly switch to a bad state with increased asset payo risk. In our setup the increase in risk is entirely self-ful lling and does not involve an exogenous increase in payo risk. 2 When we talk about \the asset price", we refer to a market portfolio of risky assets or stocks rather than the equity of a particular rm.
1 only risk associated with future asset payo s matters. The asset price then depends on the covariance between the stochastic discount factor and these payo s. However, when introducing constraints on risk exposure, such as value-at-risk or margin constraints, the asset demand again depends on risk associated with future asset prices. Such constraints are natural in a world where highly leveraged nancial institutions are subject to the possibility of default. A substantial literature introducing such constraints has developed in recent years.
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A simple way to model the impact of future risk and to illustrate the possibility of self-ful lling risk shifts is to consider a mean-variance portfolio model. This can capture the impact of risk-based portfolio constraints, while avoiding their inherent complexity. 4 Moreover, the mean-variance portfolio model has a long history in academics and is widely used in the nancial industry. It has the important advantage of generating a simple relationship between future asset price risk and portfolio demand, which leads to a linear relationship between the asset price and future asset price risk in equilibrium.
We nd that beyond a regular fundamental equilibrium there are equilibria in which risk and the volatility of risk uctuate in an entirely self-ful lling way. There is always a variable that is a coordination device for the self-ful lling shifts in beliefs about risk. This can either be a variable extrinsic to the model or a macro fundamental that is part of the model. We refer to these as respectively sunspot and sunspot-like equilibria. 5 In a sunspot-like equilibrium the fundamental variable plays a dual role. It a ects the asset price both through its regular role as fundamental (e.g. through asset payo s or wealth) and as a sunspot-like variable around which beliefs about risk are coordinated. 6 Sunspot-like equilibria are con-ceptually distinct from accelerator mechanisms where frictions in markets amplify the impact of a change in the fundamental variable. Those are pure fundamental equilibria. Risk panics are closely related to the presence of sunspot-like equilibria. Apart from a pure fundamental equilibrium and sunspot-like equilibrium, the model also exhibits switching equilibria where there are exogenous shifts between a low-risk state and a high-risk state based on a Markov process. A panic is a switch from the low-to the high-risk state. During a panic, a macro variable suddenly becomes a focal point for self-ful lling shifts in beliefs about risk. The panic is therefore not triggered by a change in the variable, but by the sudden self-ful lling shift in beliefs about risk that is coordinated around this variable. The panic is larger when this variable is weak at the time of the shift (e.g. the net worth of leveraged institutions is low or the Greek debt is high).
Our theory is consistent with the two-stage pattern of the 2007-2008 crisis: while it started in mid-2007, a full scale nancial panic did not hit until the Fall of 2008. We illustrate the self-ful lling risk shift in a version of the model where investors ( nancial institutions) are hit by a negative wealth shock. We stress the dual role of the deteriorating net worth of nancial institutions. First, it has a fundamental e ect that can account for the initial stage of the crisis. It reduces liquidity in the market for risky assets, which raises the volatility of asset prices and lowers their levels.
7 These e ects are however relatively small. Second, it sets the stage for a large nancial panic. This occurs when the low net worth suddenly becomes the focal point for a self-ful lling increase in beliefs about risk. The lower the net worth is, the larger is the impact of the panic on asset prices, volatility, liquidity and leverage. Kyle and Xiong (2001) and Xiong (2001) . 8 It bears emphasizing that our focus in this paper is on the possibility of self-ful lling risk shifts or risk panics. Every crisis has its own idiosyncratic aspects and the recent crisis obviously has many important features that go beyond the scope of this paper. For example, we abstract from aspects such as bank runs (through the repo market) and security complexity issues. We also make no attempt to account for the large losses in the securitized subprime mortgage market,
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows how self-ful lling shifts in risk naturally occur when the equilibrium price of an asset depends on the variance of the future asset price, regardless of the speci cs of the model. In Section 3 we develop the possibility of sunspot and sunspot-like equilibria in a simple mean-variance portfolio model with stochastic asset payo s (dividends). We consider both a simple model with a closed form solution and a more general one. In Section 4 we show that the model can also generate risk panics. Section 5 introduces wealth shocks, leading to an application to the 2007-2008 crisis in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Self-Ful lling Risk
The key point of the paper is general and can be illustrated without relying on the speci cs of a particular model. Consider a market where demand or supply depends not only on the current price but also on risk associated with the future price. The equilibrium price then depends on this risk. We write this in simple linear form as:
where Risk t = var t (Q t+1 ). Apart from risk, the price can depend on the expected price tomorrow and on a fundamental variable y t that exogenously shifts demand or supply. The expected future price naturally emerges in dynamic asset pricing models, but is not critical to the main point here (i.e. 2 could be zero). The key parameter for our point is 1 , which relates the price to risk about the future price.
Fundamental and sunspot equilibria
Consider rst a case where the price is not directly a ected by the fundamental y t , i.e. 3 = 0 in (1). It is immediate that there is an equilibrium, which we refer to as the fundamental equilibrium, where the price is constant:
which we simply model as a negative wealth shock to leveraged investors.
This equilibrium converges to the pure sunspot equilibrium of the previous section in the limit where 3 ! 0. In that pure sunspot equilibrium y t only plays a sunspot role (v = 0 and V 6 = 0). As we raise 3 above 0, y t takes on a dual role as a fundamental and a sunspot. But even as 3 becomes big, the sunspot role remains large. The coe cient V in (11) is not a function of 3 at all and is identical to the pure sunspot case (7) . The term V y 2 t in the equilibrium price therefore captures self-ful lling shifts in risk coordinated around the variable y t .
Although in a very di erent context, not involving self-ful lling risk shifts, Manuelli and Peck (1992) and Spears, Srivastava and Woodford (1990) present models with sunspot-like equilibria. Spears, Srivastava and Woodford (1990) point out that \...a sharp distinction between \sunspot equilibria" and \non-sunspot equilibria" is of little interest in the case of economies subject to stochastic shocks to fundamentals." Indeed, as we raise 3 slightly above 0, the sunspot-like equilibrium is technically no longer a pure sunspot equilibrium, but it is e ectively indistinguishable.
A Simple Mean-Variance Portfolio Choice Model
We now show how the linkage between risk on the future asset price and the current price emerges in a simple mean-variance portfolio choice model. The model centers on the allocation of portfolios between risky equity and a risk-free bond. We rst consider the case where the return on the bond is exogenous as this allows us to derive a closed-form solution for the fundamental and sunspot-like equilibria. We then endogeneize the interest rate in a full general equilibrium setup.
Model Description
The model complexity is kept to a strict minimum. We consider an overlapping generation setup where investors are born with wealth W I . They invest in equity and bonds and consume the return on their investment when old.
The bond pays an exogenous constant gross return R. This assumption, which is often made in the nance literature, allows us to derive a closed form solution. It implicitly assumes that there is a risk-free technology with a constant real return R that is in in nite supply. This assumption is not crucial to our results and is relaxed in Section 3.5 below.
Equity consists of a claim on a tree with stochastic payo . There are K trees, each producing an exogenous stochastic output (dividend) A t . Denoting the equity price by Q t , the equity return from t to t + 1 is:
Agents face uncertainty both about the dividend and the future equity price. The dividend is equal to A(1 + mS t ), where S t follows the process (4). S t is the only state variable in the model. When m = 0 the dividend is a constant and S t becomes a pure sunspot. When m > 0, S t has a fundamental impact on the equity payo . Investors born at time t maximize a mean-variance utility over their portfolio return:
where measures risk aversion and the portfolio return is:
t denotes the portfolio share invested in equity. The gross return on equity and bonds are R K;t+1 and R respectively. The equity market clearing condition is
The OLG assumption is not critical to the results but simpli es the analysis in two ways. First, it avoids the well-known dynamic hedge term in the optimal portfolio that arises in multi-period portfolio problems. Second, the wealth level would be an additional state variable (in addition to S t ) if agents had in nite lives. We would then be unable to solve the model analytically or even represent the equilibria graphically. While we cannot get a closed form solution when the bond interest rate is endogenous, we can still represent the equilibria graphically as there is only one state variable. A shortcoming of the OLG assumption is that it prevents movements in asset prices from feeding back into the wealth of investors, a channel that can be important in a crisis. We introduce such a feedback e ect in the Technical Appendix through a simple extension of the OLG setting, with a brief discussion in Section 6.3.
Equilibrium Condition for Equity Price
The maximization of (15) with respect to t gives the optimal portfolio share, which re ects the expected excess return on equity scaled by the variance of the equity return:
Equation (17) does not restrict the portfolio share of equity to be lower than 100 percent. This share can exceed 100 percent when the equity return is not very risky, or when investors put little weight on risk. In that case the investors are leveraged, with long positions in equity and short positions in bonds.
Using (17) , the market clearing condition (16) becomes:
Equation (18) equates the equilibrium expected excess payo on equity to a risk premium that depends on the variance of the payo Q t+1 + A t+1 . We use it to solve for the equilibrium asset price Q t as a function of the single state variable S t .
Sunspot Equilibria
First consider the case where m = 0, so that S t is a pure sunspot. In that case (18) can be written in the same form as (1) with 0 = A=R, 1 = K=(RW I ) and 2 = 1=R. We again get two equilibria. The rst is the fundamental equilibrium where the asset price is constant:
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The second is the sunspot equilibrium Q t =Q V S 2 t where:
The intuition for the sunspot equilibrium is exactly the same as in Section 2. An interesting point is that the impact of the sunspot on the equity price is larger when investors have a low risk aversion or a large wealth W I . As can be seen from (18), low risk aversion or large wealth reduce the risk premium and makes it less sensitive to changes in risk. It is precisely because agents respond less to risk (i.e. are less risk averse) that large self-ful lling shifts in risk can more easily ourish. Paradoxically this implies that the asset price is more a ected by such self-ful lling shifts in risk.
Sunspot-Like Equilibria
Next consider the case where m > 0, so that shocks to S t are also fundamental shocks to the asset payo . We conjecture that the asset price is linear-quadratic in S t :
The only slight di erence with the fundamental shocks to y t in Section 2 is that the risk is now given by var(Q t+1 + A t+1 ) instead of var t (Q t+1 ). There are again two equilibria: a fundamental one and a sunspot-like one.
In the fundamental equilibrium we have V = 0 and v = m =(R ), and the asset price is:
Shocks have a bigger impact on the asset price when they are persistent. Asset price risk is constant.
In the sunspot equilibrium we have:
10 An additional restriction to make sure that the asset price is always positive is that the distribution of t is bounded. In that case S t is bounded as well. Since (R 1)Q = A V 2 ( K=W I )V 2 ! 2 , a su cient condition for the asset price to always be positive is that A is su ciently large.
As in Section 2, this sunspot-like equilibrium converges to the pure sunspot equilibrium as the fundamental shock vanishes to zero (m ! 0). In addition, the coe cient on S 2 t is again the same in the pure sunspot equilibrium (20) as in the sunspot-like equilibrium (23) . S t therefore plays a double role of a macro fundamental that a ects asset payo s and as a sunspot that leads to self-ful lling risk shifts.
Full General Equilibrium
Our analysis so far is not a full general equilibrium approach as we assume that there is an in nite supply of the risk-free bond at the rate of return R. In the remainder of the paper we relax this assumption and explicitly model the bond market equilibrium.
The bond market clearing condition equates the investors' demand for bonds to the supply. It is important that the supply of bonds be interest rate elastic. Otherwise, investors could not reallocate between stocks and bonds in equilibrium. The equity price would then be entirely pinned down by investors' wealth and there could be no sunspot or sunspot-like equilibria. There are many ways to introduce an interest rate elastic supply or demand schedule of bonds, for example by introducing interest elastic consumption/savings or investment decisions. We do so by introducing another set of agents, which we call households, who invest in bonds and a household technology detailed below.
There are overlapping generations of households born with wealth W H . Households invest their endowment in bonds and a household technology, and consume the proceeds when old. Investing K H;t+1 in the household technology at time t yields a certain household production of f (K H;t+1 ) at t + 1. The technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale, f 0 (:) > 0 and f 00 (:) < 0. Households therefore face no uncertainty. Households born at time t maximize consumption at time t + 1, which is equal to f (K H;t+1 ) + R t+1 (W H K H;t+1 ), where R t+1 is the interest rate on the bond. Consumption is maximized by equalizing the marginal return on the technology to the bond yield:
For convenience we assume a simple quadratic form for household technology.
The capital demand is then linear in the interest rate 11 : K H;t+1 = R t+1 , and the demand for bonds by households is:
Equation (25) can be positive, in which case households lend bonds to investors, or negative, in which case they borrow from investors. The bond market clearing condition is:
Using the equity market clearing condition (16), we rewrite this as
where W = W I + W H is the aggregate initial wealth. (26) gives a linear positive relationship between the equity price and the interest rate. A higher equity price raises the supply of equity. Clearing the equity market then requires investors to shift their portfolio towards equity and reduce their purchase of bonds (or borrow more from households). Bond market clearing then requires households to lower their borrowing (or increase their bond purchase), which they are induced to do through a higher interest rate.
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Using (26), the equity market clearing condition (18) becomes:
The equilibrium condition (27) only involves the equity price, which we again solve with the method of undetermined coe cients. We now no longer have an analytical solution because the time-varying interest rate leads to a non-linearity through the term Q 2 t on the left hand side. We therefore adopt a numerical approximation method along the following lines (details are given in Appendix A). As is standard in the literature, we consider an approximation of the equilibrium asset price in logs:
We then take a quadratic approximation of Q t and Q t+1 around S t = S t+1 = 0, and use the result to compute the expectation and variance of Q t+1 + A t+1 . We substitute the resulting expressions into (27) . We nally take a quadratic approximation around S t = 0, which gives a linear-quadratic expression in S t :
where Z 0 , Z 1 , and Z 2 are functions ofQ = eq; v; and V . We solve for the value of these parameters by setting Z 0 = 0, Z 1 = 0, and Z 2 = 0. While we are solving for three parameters,Q, v and V , we can represent the equilibria graphically in a (Q, v) space. De neṼ =QV . In Appendix A we show that
where 1 and 2 are functions ofQ. Substituting this into the expressions associated with Z 1 = 0 and Z 2 = 0 we obtain
where h i and g i are functions ofQ. We solve numerically for the roots of the third and fourth order polynomials (31) and (32). The polynomials represent two schedules that map a givenQ into v, with possibly multiple solutions. We plot these two schedules in a (Q, v) space with each intersection representing an equilibrium combination ofQ and v.Ṽ , and therefore V , then follow from (30).
For a given process for S t a typical parameterization gives 4 equilibria. This is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 for respectively m = 0 and m = 1. Schedule (31) is represented by the solid line and (32) by the broken line. When m = 0 the variable S t is a pure sunspot. Figure 1 shows that there is one fundamental equilibrium where v = V = 0. The other three equilibria are all sunspot equilibria. The fact that for a given process for S t there are now three sunspot equilibria rather than the single sunspot equilibrium we found before is a result of the non-linearity generated by the time-varying interest rate.
In Figure 2 , where m = 1, S t is a fundamental that drives the asset payo s. There are again 4 equilibria. Equilibrium 1 is a pure fundamental equilibrium.
As we let m ! 0, it converges to Equilibrium 1 in Figure 1 where v = V = 0. The other three equilibria are all sunspot-like equilibria. As we let m ! 0, they converge to the corresponding sunspot equilibria in Figure 1 . Figure 3 illustrates the convergence of the sunspot-like Equilibrium 2 of Figure 2 to the sunspot Equilibrium 2 of Figure 1 when m goes to zero. It is remarkable that even when we get far away from m = 0,Q, v and V change very little, especially in comparison to the near-zero levels of v and V in the fundamental equilibrium. This suggests that even when the fundamental role of S t is important, the impact of S t on the asset price is dominated by self-ful lling shifts in risk.
Risk Panics

Switching across states
Risk panics can happen in equilibria that allow for a switch between low and high risk states. In the previous section the economy was either in a fundamental or sunspot-like equilibrium. We now consider an equilibrium that allows for switches between a low risk state (indexed by 1, akin to the fundamental equilibrium) and a high risk state (indexed by 2, akin to the sunspot equilibrium). Switching occurs through an exogenous Markov process. The probability that we remain in a low risk state next period when we are in a low risk state today is p 1 > 0:5. Similarly, the probability that we remain in a high risk state next period when we are in a high risk state today is p 2 > 0:5. Equilibria 1 and 2 in Figure 2 are the points to which the low and high risk states converge, respectively, in the limit where switching is not possible (p 1 = p 2 ! 1). When switching is possible, the low risk state becomes riskier than the pure fundamental equilibrium 1 in Figure 2 . This is because there is now a possibility of switching to the high risk state, a switch that implies a signi cant drop in the equity price. Even when the probability of switching is low, the main source of uncertainty in the low risk state becomes the possibility of a jump to the high risk state rather than the pure fundamental uncertainty in Equilibrium 1 of Figure 2 .
13 Agents take the possibility of switching into account when forming their expectations. We conjecture that the log equity price in state i is
As there are two such equations we solve for 6 unknown parameters (3 for each state). This is done by imposing equity market equilibrium as before, but separately for both states. We compute the expectation and variance of Q t+1 taking into account that a switch to a di erent state is possible. The algebra is presented in Appendix B.
As an illustration, Figure 4 shows the values ofQ i , v i and V i in the low and high risk states for the case where p 1 = p 2 . As pointed out above, the two states correspond exactly to Equilibria 1 and 2 of Figure 2 when p 1 = p 2 = 1. Switching equilibria only exist when the probability of remaining in the same state is high enough. But when p 1 = p 2 is higher than this cuto (su ciently low probability of switching), the di erence between the two states quickly becomes very big. A lower probability of switching particularly reduces risk in the low risk state (lower values of v and V ).
A risk panic is a switch from the low to the high risk state. Apart from the spike in risk, the panic also entails an increase in the volatility of risk, a sharp drop in the equity price and a shift out of equity (i.e. deleveraging when investors initially hold leveraged portfolios). We graphically illustrate these e ects in Section 6 in an application to the 2008 nancial crisis.
Panics and fundamentals
It is important to be clear both about the role that fundamentals do and do not play in a panic. First, a panic is not caused by a change in fundamentals. It happens for a given level of S t . Second, the magnitude of the panic is larger the weaker the fundamental (the more negative S t ). Finally, once a panic occurs the asset price becomes much more sensitive to subsequent uctuations in the fundamental. The market becomes on edge regarding any news about S t .
Consider the rst point: a panic does not result from a change in the fundamental. As can be seen from Figure 4 , during the switch to the high risk state the coe cients v and V increase, generally by a large magnitude. This a ects risk and the asset price for a given level of S t . What changes is not S t itself but rather the role that it plays. As we switch to the high risk state, S t suddenly becomes a key variable around which agents coordinate their perceptions of risk. There is a sudden self-ful lling increase in risk with the variable S t being the focal point for the change in risk perceptions.
14 Notice that a risk panic is therefore conceptually distinct from nancial accelerator models where the impact of shocks is magni ed through nancial constraints. While small shocks have a large e ect in such models, the mechanism at work is a purely fundamental mechanism. Our framework instead puts the coordination of expectations center stage. During the panic asset prices and risk move sharply even though the state variable does not change.
Next consider the second point: the magnitude of the panic is larger the weaker the fundamental. To illustrate this point, consider the change in the equity price from the low to the high risk state. From (33) it follows that the change in the log equity price is
Since v 2 v 1 and V 2 V 1 are both positive (see Figure 4) , the drop in the equity price is larger the more negative is S t (i.e. the weaker the fundamental). Consider for instance that p 1 = p 2 = 0:65. In that case a panic lowers the equity price by only 13% when S t = 0, but by 65% when S t is two standard deviations below its unconditional mean of 0.
In this light a large risk panic can also be viewed as a delayed ampli cation effect. Consider a deterioration of the fundamental (a drop in S t ) when the economy is in the low risk state. The shock lowers the equity price through the standard fundamental mechanism, but this impact is relatively small. The delayed ampli cation e ect occurs if at some later date there is a switch to the high risk equilibrium. At that point, the sunspot role of S t suddenly surges. The impact of the panic on the asset price is much larger than the fundamental impact of S t in the rst stage. We will further illustrate this point in Section 6 in the context of the recent nancial crisis.
14 Even in the low risk state S t plays to some extent a sunspot role if p 1 < 1. But this role is generally much stronger in the high risk state. In the low-risk state this role only re ects the possibility of switching to the high risk state.
Finally consider the last role of the fundamental in a panic: once a panic occurs the asset price becomes much more sensitive to subsequent uctuations in the fundamental. Once we switch to the high risk state, the fundamental S t becomes the focal point around which investors coordinate their beliefs about risk. This causes them to react strongly to any change in the variable. A further deterioration can lead to a signi cant further drop in the equity price. Conversely, an improvement in the fundamental becomes a signi cant stabilizing force. In the example above with p 1 = p 2 = 0:65, the equity price drops from 100 to 35 during a panic when the fundamental is two standard deviations below its mean. But when the fundamental reverts to it mean, the equity price goes all the way back to 87, even though we are still in the high risk state.
Financial Shocks
We now slightly modify our framework to show that the mechanism of self-ful lling risk that we stress in this paper could explain various aspects of the recent nancial crisis. We focus on nancial shocks that redistribute wealth between households and investors. These shocks t more closely the storyline of the 2007-2008 nancial crisis where nancial institutions experienced large negative shocks to their wealth (net worth) connected to mortgage market losses. For convenience, we abstract from aggregate shocks in our benchmark analysis, but we show that our results are robust to allowing for aggregate losses. Financial shocks that only a ect the distribution of wealth impact the relative demand for bonds and equity as only investors are present in the equity market.
In addition to their closer link to the nancial crisis, nancial shocks are interesting as they give rise to another type of multiplicity through a circular relationship between risk and market liquidity. This type of multiplicity, that we call static multiplicity, has already been identi ed in the literature, although perhaps not in the context of a simple portfolio choice model. It is however distinct from the dynamic multiplicity that we identi ed in previous sections.
We make two changes relative to the model in Section 3.5. First, we assume that asset payo shocks have no persistence ( = 0). This simpli es the analysis as the wealth of investors is then the only state variable. Second, we introduce shocks to the wealth of investors as follows:
where
and t+1 is a shock with mean zero and variance 2 . Financial shocks only redistribute wealth and leave aggregate wealth unchanged: W I;t + W H;t = W . We assume that nancial shocks t+1 and asset payo s A t+1 are uncorrelated. Equation (34) ensures that investors' wealth is linear in t up to a quadratic approximation:
A rise in t implies a drop in the relative wealth of investors.
The parameter m allows us to vary the fundamental impact of wealth shocks. If m = 0, t does not a ect wealth and becomes a pure sunspot. The equity market clearing condition remains the same as (18) , but now with time-varying wealth of investors:
The model is solved the same way as in Section 3.5, with a quadratic approximation of the market clearing condition around t = 0. The details can be found in the Technical Appendix. The asset price is again a linear-quadratic function of the state variable:
We now examine more closely the two types of multiplicity that arise with nancial shocks.
Static Multiplicity: Interaction Between Risk and Liquidity
The static multiplicity generated by nancial shocks is linked to the concept of market liquidity. It is most clearly illustrated by assuming that the state variable Market liquidity is related to the price impact of asset demand shocks. Liquidity is low when shocks have a large impact on either the price or the expected excess payo of the asset. The two are related as a larger change in the equilibrium expected excess payo requires a larger adjustment of the current price. For our purposes it is convenient to de ne liquidity as the impact of wealth shifts on the expected excess payo :
A reduction in the wealth of investors (a higher t ) lowers the demand for equity. The expected excess payo on equity then needs to increase to bring investors back into the market. The more it increases, the more negative (37) is and the lower liquidity. Di erentiating the equity market clearing condition (36), liquidity is equal to:
Liquidity is low ((38) is more negative) when risk is high or wealth is low. High risk implies that equity is unattractive and investors take a small position in the equity market. With a limited exposure to the equity market, investors respond less to changes in the expected excess payo on equity. Larger changes in the expected excess payo are then necessary to clear the equity market, so liquidity is low. Similarly, lower wealth means that less money is on the line in the equity market. Larger changes in the expected excess payo are then needed to clear the market.
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The model implies a circular relationship between risk and liquidity. High risk implies that investors hold a small portfolio share in equity. The equity market is then thin and liquidity low. Low liquidity in turn implies a large price impact of asset demand shocks, so that risk is indeed high. This circular relationship leads to two equilibria for = 0. This is illustrated in Figure 5 , which represents schedules (31) and (32). Apart from wealth shock parameters, the parameterization is the same as used in Figures 1 and 2 . Equilibrium 1 is the low risk equilibrium, where v and V are close to zero, while Equilibrium 2 is the high risk equilibrium.
The static multiplicity is closely related to multiple equilibria in limited participation models such as Pagano (1989), Allen and Gale (1994) and Jeanne and Rose (2002) . 17 In these models there are relatively few agents in the market in the high risk equilibrium. Liquidity is then low and risk high. The opposite is the case in the low risk equilibrium. Even though we do not allow agents to enter or exit the market, investors' exposure to equity is lower when risk is high. While the static multiplicity has been recognized in the literature, its appeal is limited for two reasons. First, risk is constant within each equilibrium (low-and high risk), which is empirically not satisfactory. Second, the static multiplicity arises only for nancial shocks, but not for shocks on asset payo s for instance. With transitory asset payo shocks, the only equilibrium is the fundamental one where the asset price and risk are constant.
Dynamic Multiplicity: Sunspot and Sunspot-Like Equilibria
The dynamic multiplicity that arises when > 0 is the focus of the paper. It is illustrated in Figure 6 , which uses the same parameterization as Figure 5 except that we set = 0:4. Panel A shows results for m = 2 and Panel B for m = 0. In both panels Equilibrium 1 is the fundamental equilibrium. The other equilibria in Panel A are all sunspot-like equilibria, which converge to the corresponding pure sunspot equilibria in Panel B when m ! 0. These equilibria again exhibit self-ful lling shifts in risk, which are now coordinated around the variable t . The dynamic multiplicity can thus generate time-varying risk.
Even though the fundamental shock is now di erent from earlier sections, the sunspot-like equilibria in Panel A are quite similar to those in Figure 2 for the asset payo shocks. The reason for this similarity is the dominance of the sunspot aspect of the variable. Any macro variable can play this role, irrespective of the particular role that is plays as a fundamental within the model.
Application to 2007-2008 Financial Crisis
This section uses our setting to shed light on the 2007-2008 nancial crisis. After presenting some basic nancial data, we simulate the model and show that it generates an outcome qualitatively similar to what happened during the crisis. It should be emphasized that there are many important aspects of the recent crisis that are well beyond the scope of this paper. To the extent that our model is applicable in shedding light on the crisis, it is primarily in the context of the self-ful lling shifts in risk perceptions that are the focus of this paper. We take the accumulating nancial losses of leveraged investors as given (re ected in the nancial shocks) and focus on the implications for the dynamics of risk, leverage, liquidity and asset prices.
Dynamics of Risk, Leverage, Liquidity, and Asset Prices
The crisis came in the form of a one-two punch. The rst part is the relatively calm period from the beginning of 2007 until September 2008. The second part is the nancial panic that started in September 2008. The panic peaked by the end of 2008 and it took several quarters for the situation to return to a more normal state. Using data for the United States, we focus on the following variables: (1) stock prices, (2) T-bill rate, (3) equity price risk, (4) volatility of risk, (5) net worth of leveraged institutions, (6) leverage, and (7) market liquidity. Stock prices are measured by the DJ U.S. total stock market index. Risk is measured as the CBOE SPX volatility VIX index. Volatility of risk is the standard deviation of the VIX index over the past 30 days. Net worth and leverage are based on U.S. brokers and dealers as reported by the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds. Market liquidity is di cult to measure in the data as it is a theoretical concept that does not have a straightforward empirical counterpart. We construct a measure similar to Amihud (2002) which, of di erent market liquidity measures, correlates the most with estimates of price impact computed using very high-frequency data (see Goyenko et al., 2009 ). Starting with individual stocks, we compute the average absolute daily stock price change over a month per dollar of daily trading volume. This is then averaged over 100 stocks from the S&P index.
18 A high value of our measure indicates low market liquidity. It is therefore a measure of illiquidity. The dynamics of the variables during the crisis are illustrated in Figure 7 . The vertical line represents the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, which we consider to be the start of the nancial panic. After a modest decline in stock prices and a small increase in risk during the tranquil period of the crisis, stock prices suddenly crashed and risk spiked in September 2008. The volatility of risk also shot up, while it showed no trend in the rst stage. A ight to quality lowered the T-bill rate to near zero. Net worth gradually declined after mid 2007 until the third quarter of 2008, to quickly recover after the crisis. Financial leverage rst rose signi cantly during the tranquil period, and then fell sharply during the panic stage. Finally, liquidity fell modestly during the tranquil part of the crisis, followed by a sharp drop in liquidity during the panic and then a return back to normal by mid-2009.
Model Simulation
We illustrate the dynamics of the variables in the model, and relate them to the recent crisis, using the two-state switching equilibrium as described in Section 4. The parameters are shown at the bottom of Figure 8 . The main results are robust to the precise parameter values chosen, as discussed below. We set p 1 = 0:95 and p 2 = 0:7. This ensures that the high risk state occurs much less frequently than the low risk state, as the economy spends only 14% of the time in the high risk state. Panics of a large magnitude are even less frequent because they require not only a switch to the high risk state but also a very weak fundamental.
The parameterization is chosen to make sure that investors are substantially leveraged. Investors' initial equity holdings are four times their net worth (wealth), and are nanced by borrowing from households through bonds. High leverage is characteristic of most nancial institutions. We therefore also refer to the investors as leveraged nancial institutions.
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of Acharya and Pedersen (2005) the illiquidity measure is multiplied by the ratio of the aggregate volume for all stocks in the sample at the end of a month to the same aggregate volume at the beginning of the sample. 19 While leverage is less than seen in the data for brokers and dealers, our investors should be seen as an aggregate of all investors. A possible re nement is to consider two sets of investors with di erent degrees risk aversion. A rst group of \long" investors with a relatively high risk aversion We simulate the model over 16 periods, which we interpret as quarters. We do no make any attempt to match the process of nancial losses in the data, but instead illustrate the drivers of the model through a simple step function for t , along with a simple switching between low and high risk states. The dynamics of t are illustrated through the wealth of investors, which follows the same path, in the rst chart of Figure 8 . The economy is initially in a low risk state with t at its unconditional mean of zero. t rises from 0 to 0.3 in period 2, which we can think of as Q1 2007 when the losses of leveraged institutions on mortgage securities became apparent, leading to a reduction of their the wealth. This situation lasts until period 8, which we can think of as Q3 2008, where the economy switches to the high risk state. It stays in that situation until period 11 (Q2 2009) when t falls back to zero thanks, for example, to a recapitalization of leveraged institutions. The economy reverts back to the low risk state in period 14 (Q1 2010).
These dates are not meant to match the exact length of the panic or the period of nancial weakness of leveraged nancial institutions. Our focus is instead to highlight the separate roles of the nancial health of leveraged institutions and the speci c risk state. This is done by considering all possible combinations of nancial health (normal versus bad) and the state (low risk, high risk) in order to evaluate the speci c contribution of both elements.
The simulation is presented in Figure 8 . Periods during which t changes are marked by vertical dotted lines, while the shaded area denotes the time spent in the high risk state. The wealth of investors follows the overall pattern seen in the data for brokers and dealers in Figure 7 , although the deterioration of the net worth of nancial institutions was obviously more gradual in the data. The other panels show the paths of the equity price, risk, the volatility of risk, interest rate, leverage and illiquidity. The stock price (normalized at 100 initially) and gross interest rate are Q t and R t+1 . Risk is measured as the standard deviation of Q t+1 =Q t , taking into account the possibility of switching to another state. The volatility of risk is would not be leveraged, while the second group with low risk aversion would be the \leveraged" investors. This would connect somewhat closer to reality, but would not fundamentally change any of the results. The basic market clearing equation (18) would be similar with two groups of investors. The only di erence is that the ratio W I;t = would be replaced by a risk-aversion weighted wealth (W L;t = L + W N L;t = N L ), where the subscripts L and N L stand for respectively leveraged and non-leveraged investors.
the standard deviation at time t of our risk measure at t + 1. 20 Leverage is equal to the share of equity in investors' portfolio, t . Finally, illiquidity is measured as the absolute value of the derivative of the log equity price with respect to t . This connects well to the Amihud measure used in the data, which is also meant to capture the price impact of shocks. Results are very similar when illiquidity is de ned as the impact of t on the expected excess payo , as in Section 5.1. During the tranquil part of the crisis the shift in wealth away from leveraged nancial institutions reduces demand for equity and therefore its price. It also leads to a decline in liquidity (see Section 5.1), which increases risk and reduces the equity price further. Nonetheless Figure 8 shows that these e ects are all quite modest. The only large change is leverage, which almost doubles. While the small increase in risk reduces leverage, this is more than o set by an increase in the expected excess return due to the lower equity price.
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The second stage of the crisis, when the economy shifts into the high-risk stage, is characterized by a surge in risk and its volatility. This prompts a sharp reduction in the equity price and leverage. The drop in leverage in turn dries up liquidity in the equity market. The switch to bonds leads to a sharp drop in the interest rate.
An important message from Figure 8 is that a large surge in risk requires two ingredients, either one of which alone is not su cient. First, there needs to be a selfful lling risk panic (switch to the high risk state). Second, the fundamental around which the market perceptions of risk coalesce (net worth of leveraged institutions) must be weak. A deterioration of the macro fundamental alone is not enough to generate a surge in risk. Even though the net worth of leveraged institutions drops by more than 50% during the rst stage of the crisis, risk remains relatively modest. A switch to the high risk state by itself is not enough either. Risk is restored slightly below its pre-panic level in period 11, when we are still in the high risk state but the leveraged institutions are recapitalized.
While the simple exercise we have conducted here is not meant to match precise data, the overall pattern in these variables is broadly in line with the data in Figure 7 . During the pre-panic state of the crisis the impact on the equity price, risk and liquidity is quite modest in both the data and the model. The substantial increase in nancial leverage during this period is also consistent with that in the model. Then, during the switch to the panic state the model accounts for the sharp drop in the equity price, nancial leverage, and market liquidity and the sharp increase in risk.
The volatility of risk also behaves similarly to that in the data. It surges together with risk during the panic and later on declines with the fall in risk itself. This joint behavior of risk and the volatility of risk is a critical element of the model, as discussed in Section 2.1. Risk spikes in the model only because future risk becomes more uncertain.
Sensitivity Analysis
Self-ful lling shifts in risk occur as long as the asset price is negatively a ected by risk about the future asset price. One might therefore expect the ndings in the simulation above to apply much more broadly than for the particular model assumptions and parameterization underlying Figure 8 . We con rm this through a variety of sensitivity analysis that we summarize here, with the details given in the Technical Appendix.
We rst check that the results in the simulation exercise presented in Figure  8 are robust to alternative parameter values. This is done by halving and doubling most parameters. The results remain qualitatively intact for all alternative parametrizations. In particular, a risk panic leads to a sharp increase in risk and the volatility of risk, and a large decrease in the equity price, market liquidity and leverage. The precise magnitudes are certainly sensitive to parameterization. In particular, the size of the risk panic is larger the smaller , , , and m and the larger W . Second, we assess how the speci cs of the model a ect the results. We have already seen that the nature of the fundamental around which risk panics are coordinated is not critical to the results, as shocks to asset payo s also lead to multiple equilibria and risk panics. Another modeling aspect is the assumption that nancial shocks redistribute wealth between investors and households, with no aggregate loss. We consider an alternative where the wealth loss for investors is not o set by a gain for households and nd that the results remain very similar. Lastly, we abstracted from any feedback of the asset price to wealth. We include this aspect in our OLG setting by assuming that some of the endowment when born consists of trees. This ampli es the risk panic. For example, when 29% of the wealth is subject to asset price shocks (in the low risk state at t = 0), we nd that the feedback e ect from the asset price to wealth increases the magnitude of risk panics, with risk spiking from 26% during the tranquil part of the crisis all the way to 129% at the height of the panic.
Finally, we check the robustness with respect to the approximation in the solution method. This is done by considering a cubic approximation of the market clearing condition instead of a quadratic one. The simulation results are not substantially a ected, providing con dence that the precision of the approximation method is not critical to the results.
Conclusion
Motivated by several recent crises that have shown very large spikes in risk without correspondingly large shifts in fundamentals, we develop a theory for self-ful lling shifts in risk. These shifts can occur when the asset price depends negatively on the perceived risk of the future asset price. Risk associated with tomorrow's asset price then depends on uncertainty about risk tomorrow. This dynamic mapping of risk into itself gives rise to the possibility of self-ful lling shifts in risk.
Although a risk panic occurs without any change in fundamentals, it has a larger impact the weaker the macro fundamental on which agents coordinate their perceptions of risk at the time of the panic. The sharp increase in risk and accompanying volatility of risk in turn give rise to a large drop in the asset price, decreased leverage and reduced market liquidity. The model can generate a twostage crisis, where a deteriorating fundamental at rst generates a modest impact on risk, asset prices and market liquidity, followed later on by a panic stage with much larger movements as the weak macro fundamental suddenly becomes the focal point for a self-ful lling spike in risk. This matches the developments during the 2007-2008 nancial crisis.
Our ndings open up several directions for future research. First, the equilibria that we have identi ed can be found in any model where the actions of agents 26 depend on the risk of an endogenous variable. While we have focused on asset markets, the same may be the case for example in goods and labor markets. The issue is also not limited to prices. We could replace Q with any other variable that depends on risk associated with its future level. This could for example be output. It is well-known that reduced uncertainty about the future economic environment is good for business today (e.g. see Bloom, 2009 ).
Another direction for future research is to consider multiple assets. In our entire analysis there is only one risky asset. This should therefore be interpreted as the market portfolio of risky assets, which could be a country-wide or even a global equity index. A natural question is what the implications are for stocks of individual rms. Closely related, in an open economy context one would like to know whether all countries will be a ected by a risk panic or whether it could be contained to a limited number of countries. This question relates to the widely discussed issue of nancial contagion and is analyzed in .
A nal direction for further research pertains to nancial crises. We have kept the model as simple as possible to focus on the role of self-ful lling risk shifts. A natural question is how this interacts with other elements that we have ignored for convenience. A non-exhaustive list includes nancial constraints on leveraged institutions (borrowing constraints, value at risk constraints), the possibility of default and associated bank runs, and the interaction between the nancial crisis and real economic activity. Moreover, a crucial issue is the policy recommendation that arises from our analysis. In we examine the role of leveraged institutions in the context of our model. We nd that, despite their stabilizing role in normal times, less risk averse leveraged institutions increase the magnitude of risk panics. We conclude that a policy making nancial institutions more risk averse, or more prudent, could substantially reduce volatility.
Appendix
A Numerical Solution of Model in Section 3.5
In this Appendix we describe the solution of the equilibria in the version of the model in Section 3.5. We take a quadratic approximation of the market clearing condition around S t = 0. Before doing so, we rst need to compute the expectation and variance of Q t+1 + A t+1 . From the conjecture (28) we have
(39) whereQ = eq. A quadratic approximation around S t = 0 gives
For consistency we now also model the asset payo in logs: ln(A t ) = ln( A)+mS t 0:5m 2 S 2 t . This speci cation implies that a quadratic approximation of A t around S t = 0 is A t = A(1 + mS t ). Using these quadratic approximations of Q t and A t at t + 1 and then substituting S t+1 = S t + t+1 gives
Here we have simpli ed slightly by adopting approximation 2 t+1 = 2 or var( 2 t+1 ) = 0. This holds exactly in a simple distribution where t can only take on the values and + . More generally, it is frequently adopted as a continuous time approximation. Under a normal distribution the variance of 2 t+1 is 2 4 , which is a small fourth-order term. Dropping this small term makes it easier to represent the equilibria graphically. Substituting these results into the market clearing condition (27) and taking a quadratic approximation around S t = 0 gives an equation of the form (29) . Setting the coe cients Z 0 , Z 1 and Z 2 equal to zero, we obtain respectively
Here we de ne W = W I = .
The strategy is as follows. For a given value ofQ we rst solveQV from (43) as a quadratic function of v. We substitute the result in (44) and (45). This gives respectively a third and fourth order polynomial in v that needs to be solved numerically. This leads to two schedules that mapQ into v (possibly multiple values of v) that can be graphed. Equilibria are the points where these schedules intersect.
From (43) we can solveQ
From (44) we have
(54) (60)
(62)
Substituting (46) into (50), we have
Substituting (46) into (57), we have
(70)
(72)
Equations (64) and (69) are third and fourth order polynomials that we solve numerically. The solutions mapQ into v. There may be multiple solutions (multiple v for a givenQ). We then plot these two schedules in a space with v on the vertical axis andQ on the horizontal axis, as in Figures 1-2 . There is an equilibrium when the two schedules intersect. The precise equilibria can be found by solving (43)-(45) numerically in Gauss as a xed point problem in v, V andQ. We choose starting values that are close to the equilibria found through visual inspection of where the two schedules intersect. Visual inspection gives approximate values forQ and v. The corresponding value for V follows from (46).
B Solving the Switching Equilibria
We now consider the equilibria in Section 4 of the paper where we allow for a switch between a low and high risk state. p 1 (p 2 ) is the probability that next period we will be in the low (high) risk state when this period we are in the low (high) risk state. The log equity prices in the low and high risk states are
Assume that currently we are in the low risk state at time t. Analogous to (41), the expectation of Q t+1 + A t+1 , conditional on being in a low risk state in t + 1, is E t+1 (Q t+1 + A t+1 jt + 1 is low) = a 1;low + a 2;low S t + a 3;low S 2 t where a 1;low =Q 1 (1 + ! 1 2 ) + A, a 2;low =Q 1 v 1 + m A , a 3;low =Q 1 ! 1 2 and
. Similarly, the expectation of Q t+1 + A t+1 conditional on being in the high risk state at t + 1 is
where a 1;high =Q 2 (1 + ! 2 2 ) + A, a 2;high =Q 2 v 2 + m A , a 3;high =Q 2 ! 2 2 and
where d i;low = p 1 a i;low + (1 p 1 )a i;high , i = 1; 2; 3.
The variance of Q t+1 + A t+1 is
Dropping terms in S t that are third and higher order, (77) gives 
where 
Here b i;high (i = 1; 2; 3) is de ned analogously to b i;low with subscripts low replaced by high and subscripts 1 forQ, v and ! replaced by 2. This implies that in the low risk state at t:
where (27) , and taking a second order approximation around S t = 0, again gives (29) . Setting Z 0 = 0, Z 1 = 0 and Z 2 = 0 gives respectively W (d 1;low e 1;low ) = K(c 1;low d * The economy starts in the low risk equilibrium. At time 2 the endowment of investors falls from 6 to 2.8. The economy stays in the low risk equilibrium until time 8, at which point is shifts to the high risk equilibrium. At time 11 endowments shift back towards the initial allocation. The economy remains in the high risk equilibrium until time 14, at which points it shifts back to the low risk equilibrium. illiquidity
